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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Robert Lyle Barton, Jr., appeals from his conviction for solicitation of 
perjury. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Attorney M. Lynn Dunlap represented Chris Taylor on an aggravated 
battery charge in which Barton and Kimberly Souza-Pena were witnesses and 
Barton was the alleged victim. (Tr., p. 205, L. 6 - p. 206, L. 24.) Before the 
contested preliminary hearing a friend of the defendant, Wendy Marzitelli,1 
contacted Mr. Dunlap and reported that Barton had offered to change his 
testimony "for an undisclosed amount of money." (Tr., p. 206, L. 25 - p. 210, L. 
15.) Mr. Dunlap advised Ms. Marzitelli to discuss that offer with no one else; to 
tell Barton that "we were interested in that offer;" and that he fully intended to turn 
the matter over to law enforcement. (Tr., p. 210, Ls. 16-25.) After the 
preliminary hearing was postponed upon the prosecution's motion (Tr., p. 211, L. 
20 - p. 212, L. 22), Barton approached Mr. Dunlap in the parking lot outside the 
courtroom (Tr., p. 214, Ls 4-8). Barton asked Mr. Dunlap to call him. (Tr., p. 
214, Ls. 8-17.) 
Immediately upon returning to his office, Mr. Dunlap dictated a tape 
detailing Barton's solicitation and shortly thereafter called the Office of the 
Attorney General to report the incident. (Tr., p. 214, L. 18 - p. 217, L. 9; p. 311, 
1 There are several. spellings of this name in the record; the most common one, 
and the one that will be used in this brief, is "Marzitelli." 
1 
L. 4 - p. 315, L. 22.) He was referred to a local detective, Detective Wright. (Tr., 
p. 217, L. 15 - p. 219, L. 5.) The detective arranged to record telephone calls 
and meetings between Mr. Dunlap and Barton. (Tr., p. 219, L. 7 - p. 226, L. 12.) 
When contacted, Barton offered to change his testimony for $15,000. (Tr., 
p. 227, Ls. 13-25; p. 240, L. 3 - p. 248, L. 8.) Mr. Dunlap discussed how Ms. 
Souza-Pena's testimony was more damaging to his client's case than Barton's, 
so if Barton could not "deliver her" he was not interested in any deal. (Tr., p. 226, 
L. 13 - p. 227, L. 7; p. 232, L. 10 - p. 237, L. 2; p. 323, L. 7 - p. 325, L. 20.) 
Barton approached Ms. Souza-Pen a about committing perjury for payment. (Tr., 
p. 377, L. 9 - p. 380, L. 12.) Barton brought Ms. Souza-Pena to Mr. Dunlap and 
she agreed to falsify her testimony for $5,000 and Mr. Dunlap gave her $200, 
supplied by the detective, as a down payment. (Tr., p. 250, L. 1 0- p. 263, L. 21; 
p. 326, L. 17 - p. 327, L. 5.) Thereafter Barton demanded half the payment for 
his false testimony, or $7,500, prior to testifying and told Mr. Dunlap he could 
keep the other half as a fee for representing a friend of Barton. (Tr., p. 280, L. 6 
- p. 294, L. 17.) Mr. Dunlap gave Barton $1,000 provided by Detective Wright as 
the up-front payment. (Tr., p. 294, L. 23 - p. 295, L. 3; p. 327, Ls. 6-18.) Police 
arrested Barton as he left Mr. Dunlap's office with the cash. CR., pp. 17-18.) 
The state charged Barton with solicitation of perjury and conspiracy to 
commit perjury. CR., pp. 66-68.) 
Before trial Barton requested a jury instruction and a hearing on the 
applicability of an entrapment defense. (R., pp. 142-44, 150-51.) The state 
objected to any entrapment defense. (R., pp. 180-82.) The district court took up 
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the matter as requested. (Tr., p. 12, L. 20 - p. 13, L. 2.) The court first inquired 
as to whether Barton intended to admit that he committed the crime as is 
required for assertion of the entrapment defense. (Tr., p. 13, L. 16 - p. 14, L. 
24.) 
Barton stated he did not intend to admit that he committed the crimes, 
claiming he could distinguish cases holding that admission of the crime is a 
prerequisite to asserting the defense. (Tr., 14, L. 25 - p. 15, L. 12.) Barton 
asserted his theory of the case was that he was approached by Ms. Marzitelli, 
who conveyed an offer of money for Barton not to testify. (Tr., p. 15, L. 13 - p. 
16, L. 25.) Ms. Marzitelli was acting as an agent of attorney Lynn Dunlap, Barton 
alleged, but neither one was at that time an agent of the state. (Tr., p. 17, L. 1 -
p. 18, L. 5.) According to Barton, it was Mr. Dunlap, who by then had notified the 
police, who suggested that Barton "bring in Kimberly Souza-Pena," the gravamen 
of the solicitation of perjury charge. (Tr., p. 18, L. 6 - p. 19, L. 23.) Because 
Barton went along only "to sting the attorney" he both did not commit the offense 
and was entrapped into committing it. (Tr., p. 19, L. 24 - p. 22, L. 10.) 
The court denied the defense in opening statements for several reasons. 
(Tr., p. 36, Ls. 1-7.) First, it concluded it had not heard in the offer of proof any 
evidence that the criminal intent originated with the government. (Tr., p. 36, L. 7 
- p. 38, L. 3.) Second, it concluded that the offer of proof indicated that the 
motive of Mr. Dunlap was not to secure grounds for prosecution but was rather to 
benefit his client. (Tr., p. 38, L. 4 - p. 39, L. 4.) Third, under Barton's theory all 
the police did was furnish the opportunity to commit the crime. (Tr., p. 39, Ls. 5-
3 
15.) Although the court barred mentioning the entrapment defense specifically in 
openings, it held that Barton could present evidence on it. (Tr., p. 39, L. 16 - p. 
41, L. 6.) At trial Barton testified that he had merely gone along with Mr. Dunlap 
in an effort to conduct his own private "sting" operation. (Tr., p. 525, L. 9 - p. 
578, L. 2.) 
At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence, Barton requested a jury 
instruction on the entrapment defense. (Tr., p. 653, L. 16 - p. 657, L. 11.) The 
district court denied the requested instruction on the grounds before stated and 
additionally found there was no evidence in the record "that the police hatched 
[the} idea" of Barton soliciting Ms. Souza-Pena to commit perjury. (Tr., p. 657, L. 
13 - p. 658, L. 21.) 
At the conclusion of the trial the jury convicted Barton of solicitation of 
perjury, but was "split" on the conspiracy count. (R., pp. 240-41.) The district 




Barton states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err in refusing Mr. Barton's requested jury 
instruction on the defense of entrapment? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 19.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Barton failed to demonstrate that the district court erred when it 
concluded that Barton failed to present evidence supporting an affirmative 
defense of entrapment? 
5 
ARGUMENT 
Barton Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Erred When It 
Concluded That Barton Failed To Present Evidence Supporting An Affirmative 
Defense Of Entrapment 
A. Introduction 
The jury convicted Barton of soliciting Kimberly Souza-Pena to commit 
perjury. (R., pp. 66-67, 240.) The district court rejected Barton's request for an 
entrapment instruction, finding the affirmative defense unsupported by the 
evidence. (Tr., p. 36, L. 1 - p. 41, L. 6; p. 657, L. 13 - p. 658, L. 21.) On appeal 
Barton claims the district court erred. (Appellant's brief, pp. 20-44.) Barton has 
failed to show error because review of the record shows that there is no evidence 
to support at least two of the three elements of the affirmative defense of 
entrapment-that Mr. Dunlap was an agent of the state or that Barton was not 
inclined to solicit perjury from Ms. Souza-Pena. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a jury was properly instructed is ultimately a question of law. 
Statev. Canelo, 129 Idaho 386,391,924 P.2d 1230, 1235 (Ct. App. 1996). 
c. No Reasonable View Of The Evidence Supports The Giving Of An 
Instruction On The Affirmative Defense Of Entrapment 
A district court may properly refuse a requested instruction which is not 
supported by the evidence. State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 873, 881, 736 P.2d 1327, 
1335 (1987); State v. Mason, 111 Idaho 660, 669-70, 726 P.2d 772, 781-82 (Ct. 
App. 1986) (self-defense instruction not supported by evidence). To be entitled 
to an instruction on an affirmative defense, a defendant must "present facts 
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sufficient to make out a prima facie case relevant to [the] defense." State v. 
Camp, 134 Idaho 662, 665-66, 8 P.3d 657, 660-61 (Ct. App. 2000). See also 
State v. Canelo, 129 Idaho 386, 392, 924 P.2d 1230, 1236 (Ct. App. 1996) 
(defendant must show "that there is a reasonable view of the evidence presented 
that would support the theory of entrapment"). Review of the record in this case 
shows no reasonable view of the evidence supporting the affirmative defense of 
entrapment. 
There are three elements of an entrapment defense: 
entrapment occurs when [1] an otherwise innocent person, not 
inclined to commit a criminal offense, [2] is induced to do so by a 
State agent who, desiring grounds for prosecution, [3J originates 
the criminal design and implants in the mind of the innocent person 
the disposition to commit the alleged offense. 
Suits v. State, 143 Idaho 160, 162, 139 P.3d 762, 764 (Ct. App. 2006) (brackets 
added) (citing Canelo, 129 Idaho at 391, 924 P.2d at 1235 and State v. Kopsa, 
126 Idaho 512,519,887 P.2d 57, 64 (Ct. App. 1994)). See also State v. Koller, 
122 Idaho 409, 411, 835 P.2d 644, 646 (1992); State v. Mata, 106 Idaho 184, 
185, 677 P.2d 497, 498 (Ct. App. 1984); I.C.J.I 1513. Thus, Barton has the 
burden of showing a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a 
finding that the criminal design originated with a state agent desiring grounds for 
prosecution, that Barton was "an otherwise innocent person, not inclined to 
commit a criminal offense," and that the state agent implanted the design in 
Barton's mind. Review of the evidence shows there was no evidence for at least 
the first two of these elements. 
7 
1. There Is No Evidence That Criminal Intent Originated With A State 
Agent 
Generally an agent is a person authorized by a principal to take actions on 
behalf of that principal. Vreeken v. Lockwood Engineering, B.V., 148 Idaho 89, 
109,218 P.3d 1150, 1170 (2009) (attorney hired to file UCC statements was 
agent with actual authority to bind principal). The only evidence of police 
involvement in the crime was that they recorded the conversations between Mr. 
Dunlap and Barton and provided the money used as down payments. Unlike 
confidential informant situations, where the police recruit a known member of the 
criminal milieu to work for them, Mr. Dunlap contacted police to report that he 
had been approached about a pay for perjury scheme. There is absolutely no 
evidence that the state recruited Mr. Dunlap to be its agent in any way; that the 
state directed Mr. Dunlap to suggest including Ms. Souza-Pena in the scheme; or 
that Mr. Dunlap acted out of a desire to obtain grounds for prosecution. To the 
contrary, the only evidence is that Mr. Dunlap was not acting under any state 
direction or agency when he told Barton that there could be no deal unless Ms. 
Souza-Pena were included in the pay for perjury scheme. (Tr., p. 335, Ls. 10-
13.) Although the state and Mr. Dunlap were cooperating, there is no evidence 
of an agent-principal relationship. 
On appeal Barton argues that Mr. Dunlap assisted law enforcement to 
gather evidence in an attempt to benefit his criminal client through discrediting 
Barton. (Appellant's brief, pp. 24-25.) While it is true that Mr. Dunlap's motive 
was to benefit his client in the criminal case, such is not a prosecution motive and 
there is no evidence that such motive originated with the state. The whole idea 
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that the state was trying to discredit its own witness to benefit a man it had 
charged with violent felonies is absurd on its face. Mr. Dunlap was acting in his 
own and his client's interests, not the state's. (See,~, Tr., p. 333, L. 7 - p. 
334, L. 9 (Mr. Dunlap's goals were "burning" Barton, exonerating his client, and 
protecting his license).) There is no evidence that the state recruited a defense 
attorney to act as its agent in an attempt to get the state's witness to secure 
perjured testimony damaging to the state's prosecution of a different defendant. 
Barton next argues that Detective Clements effectively testified that Mr. 
Dunlap was a state agent. (Appellant's brief, pp. 25-26.) In context, however, 
Detective Clements merely testified that Mr. Dunlap would not have gone through 
with the scheme absent law enforcement involvement, including supplying the 
money. (Tr., p. 497, L. 11 - p. 502, L. 15.) This is hardly surprising; had Mr. 
Dunlap proceeded without law enforcement involvement or using his own client's 
funds he would have faced criminal charges or disbarment. (Tr., p. 214, L. 18 -
p. 219, L. 10; p. 329, L. 25 - p. 331, L. 16.) That the state effectively clothed Mr. 
Dunlap with protection against such negative consequences under the 
circumstances of this case hardly rendered him a state agent. 
Barton's claim that Mr. Dunlap was acting as an agent of the state stems 
entirely from the fact that without police involvement Mr. Dunlap would not have 
proceeded in any fashion on Barton's pay for pe~ury offer. That the state made it 
possible for Mr. Dunlap to proceed did not render Mr. Dunlap a state agent. On 
the contrary, the evidence affirmatively shows that the state did not control Mr. 
Dunlap's actions and that its involvement was limited to recording the 
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transactions and providing the "buy" money. There is no evidence to support the 
element of inducement by a state agent. 
2. Barton Was Not An Otherwise Innocent Person Not Inclined To 
Commit The Offense 
Under the state's theory of the case Barton approached Mr. Dunlap 
through Ms. Marzitelli about selling false testimony. (Tr., p. 206, L. 25 - p. 210, 
L. 15.) Under Barton's theory Ms. Marzitelli approached him about whether he 
would be willing to take payment to change his testimony and he went along in 
order to "sting" the attorney. (Tr., p. 529, L. 24 - p. 533, L. 1; p. 543, L. 12 - p. 
544, L. 1.) Under neither theory was Barton not inclined to solicit perjury from 
Ms. Souza-Pena when Mr. Dunlap stated that she would have to be included in 
the bargain. (Tr., p. 538, L. 25 - p. 539, L. 23; p. 541, L. 13 - p. 543, L. 11.) At 
no point did Barton tell Ms. Souza-Pen a that she wasn't making a genuine deal 
for perjury. (Tr., p. 539, L. 12 - p. 540, L. 11; p. 564, L. 22 - p. 566, L. 15.) 
Barton specifically testified that he was "only too happy" to bring Ms. Souza-Pena 
into the pay for perjury scheme as part of his desire for revenge against all 
involved in the criminal case stemming from the attack on him. (Tr., p. 566, Ls. 
7-15; p. 570, Ls. 5-16.) In short, there was no evidence presented at trial that 
Barton was not inclined to solicit Ms. Souza-Pena to perjure herself. 
Barton argues he was an innocent person not inclined to commit the 
offense of soliciting perjury from Ms. Souza-Pena because Mr. Dunlap insisted 
that there could be no deal for Barton's perjured testimony unless Ms. Souza-
Pen a also provided testimony favorable to his client. (Appellant's brief, pp. 26-
10 
28.) The evidence showed that Mr. Dunlap stated he wanted Souza-Pena 
included in the perjury scheme during negotiations for Barton's perjured 
testimony. (Tr., p. 232, L. 10 - p. 236, L. 25; p. 538, L. 25 - p. 539, L. 17; p. 558, 
Ls. 9- 24.) There is no evidence that Barton was innocent (he was in the process 
of negotiating his own perjury, even by his own admission) or not inclined to 
solicit Ms. Souza-Pena for perjury (he stated he was "happy" to solicit her to 
commit perjury because she was associated with the men who had attacked 
him). By making the whole deal contingent on Ms. Souza-Pena also providing 
favorable testimony Mr. Dunlap merely provided the opportunity for the crime. 
Canelo, 129 Idaho at 392, 924 P.2d at 1236 (providing opportunity to commit 
crime is not entrapment, but is a legitimate method of ferreting out crime). 
There are parallels between this case and Kopsa, 126 Idaho 512, 887 
P.2d 57. In that case airline employees opened a suspect package and found 
methamphetamine. A police officer masquerading as an airline employee 
delivered the package when Kopsa claimed it. The officer told Kopsa that he 
knew the package contained methamphetamine and insisted that Kopsa give 
some of it to him or he would tell the police. Kopsa initially denied knowing what 
was in the package, but eventually relented and delivered methamphetamine to 
the officer. The state charged Kopsa with trafficking and with delivery. kl at 
516,887 P.2d at 61. 
On appeal Kopsa challenged the district court's denial of a motion to 
dismiss the delivery charge based on entrapment. She argued she would not 
have delivered methamphetamine to the officer "had he not induced her to do 
11 
SO." 1st at 519, 887 P.2d at 64. Although the court accepted as true that Kopsa 
would not have delivered methamphetamine to the officer absent the officer's 
instigation, that instigation occurred during the commission of another crime, was 
a legitimate method of determining whether Kopsa knew what was in the 
package, and therefore merely provided her with the opportunity to commit the 
crime. 1st at 519-20,887 P.2d at 64-65. 
Here, as in Kopsa, the instigation to solicit perjury from Ms. Souza-Pena 
occurred during the commission of a crime-the negotiations for Barton's own 
perjury. Any pressure brought to bear by Mr. Dunlap to commit the crime (which 
amounted to nothing more than Barton would not get any money if he did not get 
Ms. Souza-Pen a to go along) pales in comparison to the pressure brought by the 
officer on Kopsa. In short, there is simply no evidence that Barton was an 
innocent person not inclined to solicit perjury from Ms. Souza-Pena or that he 
was somehow bullied into doing so by Mr. Dunlap. 
Review of the record shows that there is no evidence supporting a factual 
finding on at least two of the three elements of an entrapment defense. There is 
no evidence that Mr. Dunlap was a state's agent; the only evidence of state 
involvement is that the police monitored the conversations and provided the 
money for payments. There is no evidence that Barton was innocent or not 
inclined to commit the offense; by his own testimony he was "happy" to solicit the 
perjury in an effort to "sting" anyone involved in the defense of the criminal case 
in which he was the alleged victim. Having failed to show substantial evidence 
12 
supporting entrapment, Barton has failed to show error in the district court's 
refusal to give an instruction on the entrapment affirmative defense. 
D. Because Barton's Theory Of The Case Was That He Did Not Commit The 
Crime, He Was Properly Precluded From Claiming That He Committed 
The Crime Only Because He Was Entrapped 
There was also no error in declining the instruction because Barton did not 
admit the offense as a prerequisite to asserting the affirmative defense of 
entrapment. Generally speaking, an affirmative defense is a defense "assuming 
the complaint to be true." Black's Law Dictionary (Rev. 4th Ed.). In Idaho a 
defendant "is not in a position to assert the entrapment offense" if he "never 
admitted [committing] the underlying offenses." Suits v. Idaho Board of 
Professional Discipline, 138 Idaho 397, 400, 64 P.3d 323, 326 (2003) (citing 
Mata, 106 Idaho at 185-86, 677 P.2d at 498-99).2 See also Suits, 143 Idaho at 
162-65,139 P.3d at 764-67. This is so because a claim that the "criminal offense 
did not happen" is "inconsistent" with a claim that the defendant was "entrapped 
into committing the crime." Suits, 138 Idaho at 400, 677 P.3d at 326. 
Here Barton's testimony was directly contrary to a claim of entrapment. 
The gravamen of an entrapment defense is that the intent to commit the crime 
2 Although some states require the defendant to present affirmative evidence he 
is admitting having committed the crime before he may assert the affirmative 
defense of entrapment, ~ State v. Soule, 811 P.2d 1071, 1072 (Ariz. 1991), 
others merely provide that a defendant who presents evidence inconsistent with 
a theory of entrapment may not assert entrapment as a defense, ~ Melton v. 
State, 713 S.W.2d 107, 112 (Tex. Crim. App., 1986). Idaho law seems more 
compatible with the latter than the former. 
13 
did not "originate in the defendant's mind" but was instead "placed there by the 
government." Mata, 106 Idaho at 186, 677 P.2d at 499. This is sometimes 
called the "subjective" theory of entrapment because it focuses on the 
defendant's subjective intent in committing the crime. kl As set forth above 
more fully, Barton's theory (and testimony) was that he never had criminal intent. 
Having criminal intent placed there by the government and not having criminal 
intent at all are mutually exclusive. It would be highly ironic in a perjury trial to 
allow Barton to testify to both. For the defense to argue entrapment in this case, 
it would necessarily have to argue that the jury must reject Barton's testimony as 
being untruthful. 
Barton first argues that Idaho law allows the presentation of the 
entrapment defense to a crime the defendant denies committing. (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 34-39.) He bases his argument on a claim that the Idaho Supreme 
Court "implicitly" rejected the admission requirement by not mentioning the 
requirement at all in State v. Garde, 69 Idaho 209, 205 P.2d 504 (1949). 
(Appellant's brief, p. 35). In Garde, the Court rejected the defendant's 
entrapment claim because it was unsupported by the evidence, without ever 
mentioning the propriety of giving an entrapment instruction where the defendant 
testified he did not commit the crime. Because the Court did not even entertain 
the question of whether a defendant who testifies he did not commit the crime 
may assert the entrapment defense, it did not reject ("implicitly" or otherwise) the 
requirement that the entrapment defense be consistent with the defense 
evidence. Barton's reliance on the Garde decision is misplaced. 
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Barton next argues that existing authority requiring admission of the 
offense before asserting the affirmative defense of entrapment should be 
overruled. (Appellant's brief, pp. 39-44.) Controlling precedent will not be 
overruled "unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be 
unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious 
principles of law and remedy continued injustice." State v. Humpherys, 134 Idaho 
657, 8 P.3d 652, 655 (2000) (quoting Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 
Idaho 72,77,803 P.2d 978,983 (1990)). See also State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 
981, 1001, 842 P.2d 660, 680 (1992) ("[P]rior decisions of this Court should 
govern unless they are manifestly wrong or have proven over time to be unjust or 
unwise."); State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 440-52, 825 P.2d 1081, 1096-1108 
(1991) (McDevitt, J., specially concurring) ("While it may seem stare decisis is a 
rule of convenience, it is not. I believe that this rule requires us to stand by our 
prior decisions unless there are compelling and cogent reasons that necessitate 
a departure from our prior rulings."). The rule preventing a defendant from 
testifying to a version of events inconsistent with the entrapment defense but 
then presenting that defense to the jury is not manifestly wrong nor has it proven 
unjust or unwise. 
Courts taking an approach similar to Idaho have presented solid 
justifications for the rule that a defendant who testifies inconsistently with an 
entrapment defense is not entitled to an entrapment defense instruction. 
Entrapment is a "classic confession and avoidance" defense in which "the 
commission of the offense is admitted and the accused seeks to avoid criminal 
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liability therefore by maintaining that the government induced him to commit an 
offense that he was not predisposed to commit." State v. Doran, 449 N.E.2d 
1295, 1300 (Ohio 1983). Thus, when a defendant insists he did not commit the 
crime, "one of the bases of the defense is absent" and he is not entitled to an 
instruction. Morris v. State, 779 S.W.2d 526 (Ark. 1989). "Because entrapment 
is an affirmative defense, it does not apply where a defendant denies committing 
the crime." People v. Hendrickson, 45 P.3d 786, 791-92 (Colo. App. 2001). 
There are also sound policy reasons behind the rule. "To allow a 
defendant to testify as to two defenses that cannot both be true is equivalent to 
sanctioning a defendant's perjury." State v. Soule, 811 P.2d 1071, 1073 (Ariz. 
1991) (emphasis original). When the defendant testifies he did not commit the 
offense, entrapment can be found only if the defendant is lying. ~ at 1074. 
Defense counsel arguing a theory that implies the defendant lied about his 
actions or his intent creates a risk of jury confusion. ~ at 1073. 
Although which approach to the entrapment defense taken by courts is 
preferable may be debatable, the rule adopted in Idaho is neither "manifestly 
wrong" nor "proven unjust or unwise." On the contrary, the rule requiring 
admission of having committed the underlying crime before an instruction on the 
affirmative defense of entrapment will be given "is based on common sense and 
sound logic." People v. Gillespie, 557 N.E.2d 894, 897-98 (III. 1990). 
Barton has failed to show grounds for reversing existing Idaho authority. 
Although there are reasons to allow inconsistent defenses, there are also good 
reasons to disallow defenses incompatible with the defendant's evidence. 
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Certainly cases where a defendant would desire to present a defense that can be 
found to exist only if the defendant iied on the stand, such as this one, are rare. 
It is not unjust, unwise, or manifestly wrong to deny an entrapment instruction 
under the circumstances presented in this case. Barton has therefore failed to 
show error by the district court. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Barton's conviction for 
solicitation of perjury. 
DATED this 20th day of December, 2011. 
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